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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law--"Privileges or Immunities Clause"--A Kentucky statute' taxed deposits of its citizens in Kentucky banks at a rate
of one-tenth of one per cent. annually, while taxing deposits in banks outside of the state at the rate of five-tenths of one per cent. The statute
was objected to as infringing the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship in that it abridged the right to carry on business beyond the
state of residence. Held (two justices dissenting) the statute did not
violate the "privileges or immunities" clause, which only "protects all
citizens against abridgement by states of rights of national citizenship as
distinct from the fundamental or natural rights inherent in state citizenship".2

Madden v. Kentucky,3 8 U. S. L.

WEEK 201

(U. S. 1940).

Prior to its decision in Colgate v. Harvey,4 the Supreme Court had
been asked no less than forty-five times 5 to invalidate state legislation on
the ground that it abridged the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States but the Court consistently refused to hold that the Constitution had been violated. These decisions, following the principle first
announced in the Slaughter-House Cases,6 rejected the doctrine that after
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment the fundamental rights, privileges,
and immunities, which formerly attached to an individual as a citizen of
the state in which he lived, now belonged to him as a citizen of the United
States. Instead, the Amendment was construed as protecting only interests growing out of the relationship between the citizen and the federal
government, created by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
While it was recognized that this principle was not in keeping with the
object of the framers of the Amendment,7 the decision was justified on the
ground that a different interpretation would "enlarge judicial control of
state action and multiply restrictions upon it to an extent difficult to de1. CARROLL'S KENTUCKY STATUTES (Baldwin Revision, 193o) § 4oiga-Io. "An
annual ad valorem tax for state purposes of thirty cents (3o0) upon each one hundred
dollars ($ioo.oo) of value of all other property directed to be assessed for taxation, as
provided by law, shall be paid by the owner, person, or corporation assessed except a
tax of one-tenth of one per cent. (o.o1%) (i. e., io cents upon each $xoo.) shall be
paid annually upon the amount of deposits in any bank, trust company, or combined
bank and trust company, organized under the laws of this State, or in any national bank
of this State as now provided by law; . . ."
2. The Court also held that there was no violation of the "equal protection" clause.
But see, for example, State v. Hoyt, 71 Vt. 59, 42 At. 973 (1899), which held invalid
a state statute the effect of which was to impose a tax upon the sale of goods manufactured within the state, while leaving the sale of goods manufactured without the state
free from taxation. The court ruled that the classification could not be based on the
fact that the goods were made in different states for that bore no proper and just relation to the classification but was purely arbitrary. Nor, for the same reasons, could
the classification be based on the difference of residence of the manufacturers for the
same reason. See also, Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. I5o
(1897); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412 (1920); and Louisville
Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32 (1928).
3. Aff'g, Commonwealth v. Madden's Exr., 265 Ky. 684, 97 S. W. (2d) 501 (1936).
4. 296 U. S. 404 (935).
5. See dissenting opinion in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. at 445, n. 2, for collection of forty-four of these cases. See also, Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. Co., 258
U. S. 314 (I922). "Even those basic privileges and immunities secured against federal
infringement by, the first eight amendments have been held not to be protected from
state action by the privileges and immunities clause." (Citations omitted.) Id. at 444.
6. 83 U. S. 36 (1873).
7. COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT AND THE STATES (1912) c. i; FLACK,
THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT (I908) 55 et seq.
(621)

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

622

fine, but sufficient to cause serious apprehension for the rightful independence of local governments".8 When Colgate v. Harvey was subsequently
decided, reviving the "privileges or immunities" clause, commentators were
uncertain whether that decision adopted the view repudiated in the
Slaughter-House Cases and made possible the invalidation of every state
statute construed to be in violation of some "fundamental right", judicially classified as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, or
whether only "unreasonable" discrimination was prohibited, in which case
the same result could have been reached under the "equal protection"
clause.9 The Court, in the instant case, while giving Colgate v. Harvey
the first interpretation 10 -has returned to the view that the "privileges or
immunities" clause protects only rights of national citizenship as "distinct
from the fundamental or natural rights inherent in state citizenship". 1 '
The result reached is to be heartily commended. While every foe of provincialism will applaud the doctrine "that for all purposes for which the
Federal government was formed we are one people with one common
country"; 12 no one will sorrow over the courts' loss of an almost absolute veto power over the state legislatures' attempts satisfactorily to
solve, by the use of the taxing power, the economic and social problems
of their states. If there is fear of arbitrary discrimination against "foreign" businesses by the states the "equal protection" clause furnishes an
adequate safeguard.

Constitutional Law-Tax on Solicitation of Orders for Future
Delivery from Foreign State a Burden on Interstate CommerceDefendant, a salesman, solicited orders in Minnesota for future delivery
of goods to be shipped by rail from his employer's factory in Wisconsin.
The goods were sent to defendant, the latter distributing them by truck
to the customers from whom he had solicited orders.' Defendant appeals
from a conviction for failing to obtain a license required by municipal
ordinance of all canvassing salesmen. Held, that defendant was engaged
in interstate commerce, that imposition of the license tax was an unconstitutional burden thereon, and that the conviction should therefore be
reversed. City of Waseca v. Braun, 288 N. W. 229 (Minn. 1939).
The decision of the instant court is undoubtedly consistent with
authoritative precedent which has established the well-known distinction 2
between peddlers who have their out-of-state goods with them and who
8. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 445 (1935) (dissenting opinion).
q. Howard, The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v.
Harvey, 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 262 (1939) ; Notes (1936) 24 CALn. L. REv. 728; 49
HARV. L. R-v. 935; (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 655; 36 COL. L. REv. 669; 34 Mxcn.
L. Ray. 1034; 45 YALE L. J. 926.
io. 8 U. S. L. WEEK at 202.
ii.

Id. at 202.

12. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U. S. 35, 48-49 (1867).
I. Defendant broke open the original package, placed the goods on shelves in his
Minnesota home, and then delivered to the customers who paid him. It is generally
conceded however that the "original package doctrine" has no application to the delivery
of out-of-state goods in response to an order previously taken. RoTSCHAErz, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAM. LAW (1939) § 159, P. 321; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 287 U. S.
622 (903) ; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507 (igo6).
2. See Wagner v. Covington, 251 U. S. 95, 103 (i919); HALL, CONSTrrUTONAL
LAW (I911)

§287.
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are subject to state regulation,3 and drummers who take orders for goods4
to be shipped into the state and who are not subject to state regulation.
The latter type of regulation is considered a burden on interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the federal constitution I
and was first so held in Robbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist.6 But in that
case the regulation specifically exempted all merchants having a house of
business in the taxing district, 7 a fact which clearly made the tax discriminatory. Nevertheless, the case is responsible for the general rule
that a tax imposed upon the occupation of selling goods prior to their
interstate transportation into the purchaser's state is invalid., It is urgently
suggested that the rule of that case should have been confined to the
practical considerations involved therein, rather than employed as authority for holding all taxes on interstate sales invalidY Proper analysis,
apparently, would indicate that any state tax must necessarily affect interstate commerce in some measure, 10 and the constitutionality of the tax
should depend upon the e.x'tent of burden or discrimination it imposes
upon interstate trade:" as determined from the practical considerations
of the particular regulation in question. 1 2 In this respect, the rule of the
Robbins case and other rules and distinctions of other cases should be
aids only and not determinative in themselves of the question of whether
or not the particular subject of litigation is a violation of the commerce
clause. 13 The effect of employing the doctrine to exempt salesmen bea tax, non.cause they take orders rather than sell immediately is to make
discriminatory in terms, patently discriminatory in practice. 14 Moreover,
the regulatory tax on canvassing salesmen is based upon admittedly commendable considerations of home protection,' 5 considerations just as applicable to those who merely solicit orders as to those who solicit sales. It
appears that the tax of the instant case is not only supported by sound
policy, but also is not unduly burdensome nor discriminatory as far as
interstate commerce is concerned. 16 Under the familiar rule of construc296

3. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1868); Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S.
(895) ; Wagner v. Covington, 25, U. S.95 (1919) ; Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton,

262 U.

S. 5o6

(1923).

4. Cases cited infra notes 6 and 7.
5. U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, § 8.
6. 120 U. S.489 (1887).
7. Id. at 490.
8. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289 (894); Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187
U. S. 622 (1903) ; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325 (1925). Nineteen state statutes and city ordinances have been held unconstitutional on the authority
of the Robbins case. Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce (1939) 52
HA~v. L. Ray. 617, 6r8.
9. Lockhart, supra note 8, at 622,
io.See Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S.501, 505 (1922) ; Brown, State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce, and Federal and State Taxation in Intergovernmental Relatilons--930-1932 (933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 247, 248.
II.See Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S.511, 522 (935).
12. See (935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 796.
33. The "original package doctrine", originally developed in Brown v. Maryland,
12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. I827), is not "an ultimate principle", but ar "illustration of a
principal". Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, 294 U. S.511, 527 (1935). "Nice distinctions
have been made at times between direct and indirect burdens. They are irrelevant when
the avowed purpose of the obstruction, as well as its necessary tendency, is to suppress

or mitigate the consequences of competition between the states." Id. at 522.
14. See dissenting opinion, Gwein, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S.
434, 442 (939) ; Lockhart, supra note 8, at 624.
15. See concurring opinion, instant case, at 234; Sawyer, FederalRestraint on the
States' Power to Regulate House-to-House Selling (1934) 6 RocxY MT. L. Rav. 85, 87.
16. "The tax is non-discriminating and imposes no direct burden upon . . . interstate commerce." Concurring opinion, instant case, at 234.
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tion that reasonable doubts concerning the constitutionality of enactments
will be resolved in favor of holding the legislation valid, 17 and in light of
recent decisions illustrating a more liberal attitude in behalf of the states'
power to enact regulations affecting interstate commerce,' 8 the license
requirement of the instant case might well have been accorded judicial
sanction.

Corporations-Power to Abrogate Accrued Cumulative Dividends by Merger-Plaintiff moved to enjoin the merger between
defendant, a Delaware corporation of which he was a preferred shareholder, and its wholly owned subsidiary. The merger agreement provided for an exchange of the 6 per cent. preferred shares of defendant
corporation, upon which dividends of $29.0o had accumulated, for preferred and common shares of the new corporation. The only alternative
left to the plaintiff, other than acceptance of this arrangement, was to have
his shares valued as provided by statute.' Plaintiff claimed that a shareholder's right to accrued cumulative dividends could not be eliminated by
either of these means, but only by payment in cash. Held, motion dismissed; this statute is considered a part of the shareholder's contract, and,
as interpreted, grants the defendant not only the privilege to merge, but
also, because of the absence of any restrictive provision,2 the additional
privilege to abolish accumulated dividends.3 Havender v. Federal United
Corporation, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 18, I94O, p. i, col. i (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1939).
17. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718 (1878) ; WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUed. 1929) § 27; Corwin, Judicial Review in
Actio= (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 639, 645.

TIONAL LAwV OF THE UNITED STATES (2d

I8. See Brown, supra note Io, at 265. It' is stated that interstate commerce should
be required to "pay its way by bearing its share of local state burdens". Gwein, White
& Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 438 (i939). A tax on goods ordered in
advance and sent from an out-of-state producer has been sustained. Banker Bros. Co.

v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 222 U. S. 210 (1911) ; Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169 (935), 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 795. The opinion in Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (937), Note (1937) 51 HARv. L. REy. 130, is broad

enough to authorize a state to collect a tax from local purchasers even though their
purchases required subsequent interstate delivery or were made exclusively in another
state. Lockhart, supra note 8, at 641. A federal circuit court has recently sustained a
tax similar to the license requirement of the instant case, but on the reasoning that the
requirement was the regulation of a nuisance. Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush
Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. ioth, 1933). Finally, in Town of Sellersburg v. Stanforth, 209 Ind. 229, 198 N. E. 437 (1935) the court ignored the contrary federal precedent and, as many state supreme courts have done, held a similar tax valid.
I. DEL. Ray. CODE (1935) §§ 2091, 2092, 2093. Merger provisions are looked upon
with favor and broadly construed. McFarlane et al. v. North American Cement Corp.,
i6 Del. Ch. 172, 157 Atl. 396 (Ch. 1928).
2. DEL. REv. CODE (1935) § 2091: ". . . All the constituent corporations shall
enter into an agreement in writing which shall prescribe the terms and conditions of
the consolidation or merger, the mode of carrying the same into effect, the manner of
converting the shares of each of said constituent corporations into shares of the corporation resulting from or surviving such consolidation or merger and such other details
and provisions as shall be deemed necessary or proper..
3. The equitable doctrine of laches afforded an alternative ground for the decision.
An excellent discussion of its application to this case is found in the briefs of counsel.
Brief for Appellant, pp. 23-3r, Havender v. Federal United Corp., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 18, 1940, p. i, col. I (Del. Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Brief for Appellees, pp. 31-43,

ibid.
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This same court refused to permit accrued dividends to be eliminated
by a recapitalization through charter amendment in the case of Keller v.
Wilson Co.,4 or by dissolution in Penningtonv. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Corp.,5 hence this decision allowing the abrogation of these accumulated dividends by merger was unexpected. The court purports to
justify this result by treatment of this case as one of first impression.6 The
Keller case is sharply distinguished factually. Then the enabling statute
is incorporated into the shareholder's contract; 7 and the court's interpretation of the resulting agreement is strictly enforced, since an adequate and exclusive 8 remedy is provided by statutory valuation and
appraisal. Perhaps the instant reasoning could not be criticized, for
previous cases are validly distinguishable, were it not that the language
used by this very court in the Keller recapitalization case remained undiscussed in rendering this decision. The interest in accrued dividends,
often described as a vested right, 9 was regarded, until this instant case,
as an indestructible right protected by the due process, clauses of the
state and federal constitutions. 0 The only apparent explanation for this
departure, since the opinion fails to discuss this matter, is that the legislature can and has destroyed this interest by the merger provisions,
notwithstanding that if any section of this statute were to have been so
interpreted, it would seem more reasonably to have been that concerning recapitalization, because of its detailed and itemized provisions."' Also
disregarded by this court was the basis of the Keller decision: a desire to
protect the source of corporate funds, as a matter of public policy,' 2 by
safeguarding an investor who seeks certainty not speculation, 8 and who,
4. i9o Atl. 11$ (Del. Sup. Ct. 1936), (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 537; Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, i97 Atl. 489 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1937). The Keller
case is criticized as opposed to legislative intent in (1937) 31 ILL. L. REV. 661. The
ultimate effect of these cases on corporate recapitalization is discussed in Note (937)
46 YALE L. J. 985.
5. 17 Del. Ch. 394, i55 Atl. 514 (Sup. Ct. i931).
6. Four cases are very closely allied, but all are rightfully distinguishable, and the
instant court's interpretation of them is excellent. Two cases "seem to favor" abrogation: Jones v. St. Louis Structural Steel Co., 267 Ill. App. 576 (932 ) ; Windhurst v.
Central Leather Co., ioi N. J. Eq. 453, 138 Atl. 772 (Ch. 1927), aff'd, io5 N. J. Eq.
621, 849 Atl. 36 (Ch. I93O), aff'd, io7 N. J. Eq. 528, 153 Atl. 4o2 (i93i). And two
against: Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 67 Atl. 657 (Ch. 1907),
rev'd on other grounds, 75 N. J. 229, 72 Atl. 826 (19og) ; Boardman v. Lake Shore &
M. S. Ry., 84 N. Y. 857 (1881). Other suggestions have been made as to the significance of these cases: Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 836, 122 Atl.
696 (Ch. 8923) ; Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, I8 Del. Ch. 47, 856 Atl. 883 (Ch.
1931).
7. Notes (1938) 82 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 576; (8924) 38 A. L. R. 8326.
8. Goodisson v. North American Securities Co., 40 Ohio App. 85, 878 N. E. 29
(i93i) has been cited as authority to the effect that this remedy of appraisal is not exclusive. But this case, as suggested by the instant court, should be limited to its facts.
9. The use of these words have often been criticized as of a "question begging"
nature. See (937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 537, 538.
Courts have variously described "the right to accrued dividends as vested, a debt, a
right in the nature of a debt, an existing claim, a prior charge on the net earnings, a
present property interest postponable in its enjoyment but nevertheless assertable".
(1939)

88 U.

OF PA. L. RET. 884, 885.

io. See 7 FLETCHER, Cyc. CoRP. (Perm. ed. 1931) §§ 368o, 3688; id. (Cum. Supp.
1939) at § 3696; Notes (8939) 52 HARv. L. Ray. 1331, (1937) 35 MicH. L. REV. 62o.
ii. A comparison of the two sections [DEL. REV. CODE (1935) §§ 2058 and 2o9i]
was made by the Appellees, see Brief for Appellees, p. i9, Havender v. Federal United

Corp.
12. See Keller v. Wilson & Co., Inc., i9o Atl. 185,124 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1936).
13. See Note (1937) 4 U. OF CHL L. REv. 645. It has been suggested that economic
reasons favor the elimination of accrued cumulative dividends. See (1935) 8o TE P.

L. Q. 86.
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relying upon the receipt of income at some time, is induced to retain the
preferred stock. It is also apparent that the knowledge by management
that payment of accrued arrearages may be avoided may lead it to indulge
in unwise speculation even before financial difficulties have arisen. 14 In
addition, the exclusive remedy available to the dissenting shareholder of
valuation by appraisers is scarcely adequate. For, not only are there
tremendous practical difficulties in evaluation, 15 but the next development
may conceivably be failure to include accrued dividends in determining
this value, now that, under the instant holding, they may be abrogated;
even if this eventuality does not result, it will no doubt entail considerable
litigation to settle. This court also refused to foresee that because of the
power vested in management 16 recapitalization will now be accomplished
by merger instead of by amendment, through the establishment of a wholly
owned subsidiary 1 if one does not already conveniently exist. Consequently, by now permitting these dividends to be destroyed, the Court is
setting aside a previously consistent policy 18 that appears to be dictated by
social and economic desirability.

Criminal Procedure-Evidence of Prior Conviction Withheld
until Verdict-Defendants were indicted jointly for unlawful possession of alcoholic liquor. The indictment also charged that two of the
defendants had previously been convicted for violation of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act.' The result being that if these defendants were
again found guilty, they would be subject to the heavier penalty provided in that Act for a second conviction. 2 Defendants moved to quash
the indictment on the ground that the averments of prior conviction were
prejudicial and violative of the Act of 1911,3 providing that a defendant
14. See Note (1937) 4 U. OF CI. L. REV. 645, 652.
15. See Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes
(931) 45 HARV. L. REV. 233.
I6. The advantage with management is so great that: "In fact, if not in law, at the
moment we are thrown back on the obvious conclusion that a stockholder's right lies in
the expectation of fair dealing rather than in the ability to enforce a series of supposed
legal claims." BERLE AND MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932) 276. See Note (1939) 52 HARv. L. REV. 1331.
17. The lower court in the instant case recognized that this would result and refused to permit the Keller case to be so easily circumvented. Havender v. Federal
United Corp., 2 A. (2d) 143 (Del. Ch. 1938), (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 371, aff'd, 0 A.
(2d) 618 (Del. Ch. 1939) (on other grounds).

An exact analogy is afforded by Small v. Sullivan, 245 N. Y. 343, 157 N. E. 261
(1927). The corporation could not declare dividends because it had suffered losses to
such an extent that its asset value had fallen below the value of its outstanding capital.
To circumvent this defect, a consolidation was planned, with the new corporation having
assets exceeding capital; then a dividend was declared to that extent.

The court re-

fused to permit the consolidation, saying a court of equity will look through a transaction to prevent fraud even though it is carried out in strict compliance with the statutory requirements.
18. Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (Ch.
1923) ; Pennington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 394, 155
Atl. 514 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Keller v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 19o At. 115 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1936); Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 197 Atl. 489 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1937) ; see Romer et al. v. Porcelain Products, Inc., 2 A. (2d) 75, 76 (Del. Ch. 1938).
Additional cases may be found in (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 114, 115, n. 13.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 47, § 744-1 et seq.
2. Id., § 744-6o.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 293o) tit. 19, § 711. ...
any person charged with
any crime, and called as a witness in his own behalf, shall not be asked, and, if asked,
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called in his own behalf shall not be questioned as to previous convictions.
Held, motion to quash denied, but defendants fnay move the trial judge
to rule out evidence of a prior conviction until the jury returns a verdict
on the substantive offense. Commonwealth v. Boyer, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 19, i94o, p. i, col. i (Pa. C. P. 194o).
The majority of jurisdictions require an averment of the prior conviction in the indictment and permit the jury to try both issues at the
same time, on the theory that it is an essential element of the crime
charged.4 However, such a procedure is contrary to the rule that the
defendant shall be tried solely on the merits of the principal offense charged
and allows the introduction of evidence of bad character which may
prejudice the jury despite judicial admonition to the contrary. In view
of these difficulties, an increasing number of states by statute permit the
question of identity (identity of defendant charged with a prior conviction with defendant previously convicted) and prior conviction to be submitted to the jury after verdict of guilty as to the principal offense. 5 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adheres to the view that the fact of prior
conviction must be averred in the indictment, and that the question of
identity and prior conviction must be submitted to the jury.6 However,
after such an averment has been made in the indictment, a procedure
whereby the fact of prior conviction is withheld from the jury until after
the verdict on the subsequent offense, has never been ruled upon.7 The
Act of 1911,' though its effect was not considered in the Payne case,'
would seem to preclude the submission of such evidence until after the
trial. In the absence of statutory provision, or of a judicial procedure
approved by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, various plans have been
formulated for the protection of the defendant from jury-prejudice. 10 Although the averment of prior conviction in the indictment is not subject
to attack, the procedure evolved in the instant case allows the trial judge,
upon motion by the defendant, to rule out evidence of prior convictions
until the jury returns a verdict on the subsequent offense.' 1 Such an avershall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed, or
been charged with, or been convicted of any offense other than the one wherewith he
shall then be charged, or tending to show that he has been of bad character or reputation ..
4. State v. Findling, 123 Minn.413, 144 N. W. 142 (1913) ; People v. Sickles, 156
N. Y. 541, 51 N. E. 288 (1898); Keeney v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 678, 137 S.E. 478
(1927). To show the statutory trend away from the majority view, compare with
these, cases cited in note 5 infra.
5. State v. Zywicki, 175 Minn. 5o8, 221 N. W. 9oo (1928) ; People v. Gowasky,
N. Y. 451, '55 N. E. 737 (1927); State v. Smith, 128 Ore. 515, 273 Pac. 323
(1929). In the absence of an express statutory provision, one court held that neither

244

the question of prior conviction nor defendant's identity should be submitted to the jury
until
returned on the principal issue of the crime charged. State v. Ferrone, a96verdict
Conn. was
16o, 113 At. 452 (1921).
6. Commonwealth v. Payne, 242 Pa. 394, 89 At. 559 (1913) ; 2 SADL.m, CRIMINAL
PRocE~uRE iN€PENNSYLVANIA (2d ed. 1937) 793. However, the instant court follows
the construction that: "The heavier penalty cannot be imposed unless the former conviction appears somewhere in the record," and, "if these facts are averred in the indictment an attack thereon will fail." Instant case at p. 16, col. 3.
7. Instant case at p. 16, col. 4.
8. See note 3 mupra.
9. Commonwealth v. Payne, 242 Pa. 394, 89 AtI. 559 (1913).

jo. In Commonwealth v. Hagan, 20 Phila. 392 (1891), the court followed the suggestion stated in Commonwealth v. Morrow, 9 Phila. 583 (1872), i. e., the institution
of a proceeding subsequent to verdict, and held that a sentence for heavier punishment
for a second conviction may be imposed without a charge in the indictment of the previous conviction, upon a suggestion thereof by the district attorney to the court after

trial and the entry of a rule upon the defendant to show cause. This plan was followed
in Commonwealth v. Burwell, 21 Pa. Dist. 197 (911). See note ii infra.
ii. Instant case at p. 16, col. 4.
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ment in the indictment followed by the procedure outlined will meet the
requirements of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 12 minimize jury-prejudice, and afford substantial compliance with the Act of 191I. 1" The reading of the indictment containing the averment of prior conviction, at the
institution of the suit, will, practically speaking, have little or no effect
upon the jurors insofar as the question of prejudice is concerned. 4 This
plan of procedure allows evidence upon the question of identity and prior
conviction to go, as it properly should, to the determination of the punishment and not to the substantive crime charged.'- Under such a procedure, the averment of prior conviction in the indictment, intended to
apprise the defendant of his situation, is not made an instrument for his
conviction. That this is a sufficient reason for the adoption of such a
desirable procedure in Pennsylvania cannot be denied.

Descent and Distribution-After killing his wife, a husband was
adjudged guilty of manslaughter. Upon release, he seeks to recover his
wife's estate under the intestate law. Held, that he cannot recover; the
court must imply an exception to the statute so that the killer will not
profit by his own wrong. In re Sparks' Estate, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 926
(Surr. Ct. 1939).
In the absence of a statute,' there is an open conflict between the
strict provisions of the laws of descent and distribution and the courts'2
reluctance to allow a man to recover the estate of the person he killed.
In the past, respect for the intestate laws resulted in recovery in the large
majority of cases.2 More recently the trend has been to find some basis
for denying such a result, and the courts have indulged in various rationalizations to arrive at the predetermined conclusion.4 The most popular
is that of the instant court, namely, that no one shall profit by his own
wrong. The courts read this maxim into the intestate law, and imply an
12. See note 7 supra.
13. See note 3 supra.
14. And even that might be avoided. "Nor is there any reason why the damaging
statements in the indictment itself need be submitted to the jury on their retirement.
Though the indictment is usually sent out with the jury, that is largely a matter for the
discretion of the trial judge. . . . If he fears it contains matter prejudicial to the
prisoner, it is within his power to withhold it altogether, or to submit a copy with
offensive parts removed, or to cover up and seal those portions." Instant case at p. 16,
col. 4.
15. "The allegation of previous convictions is not a distinct charge of crimes, but
is necessary to bring the case within the statute, and goes to the punishment only." McDonald v. Massachusetts, i8o U. S. 311, 313 (1901).
I. New York is still one of the large minority that has not passed a statute preventing a killer from inheriting the estate of the deceased. See note 9 infra.
2. ATKINSON,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW

OF

WILLS

(937)

117-119.

The exact

nature of this conflict has been very clearly pointed out in CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1932) 40-43.

3. Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, io6 N. E. 785 (1914) ; McAllister v. Fair, 72
Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (19o6); Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. I, 136 Pac. iiii
(1913) ; Carpenter's Estate, 270 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895).
4. See AMES, LCruRES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 310-322. The leading New
York case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 5o6, 22 N. E. I88 (1889), on which the instant
court relied heavily, involved a will, but even there the court denied the murderer the
right to take under the will on the ground that the legislature could not have intended
a result so contrary to public policy and equity. See also Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md.
505, 165 At]. 470 (1933) ; Garwols v. Bankers' Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N. W. 239
(193o); Ip re Sigsworth, 104 L. J. R. 46 (Ch. Div. 1934), (935) 83 U. OF PA. L.
Rzv. 923.
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exception where none existed before. In other cases, some courts will
construct a trust in favor of those who would have taken but for the
presence of the guilty party. 5 Finally, there is the presumption that the
deceased outlived the slayer 6 so that there will be no question of additional punishment or forfeiture.' Not all courts, however, have been
willing to throw over the strict and time-hallowed provisions of the intestate laws.8 As a result, many of these jurisdictions 9 now have statutes prohibiting a murderer, or more usually one finally adjudged guilty
of murder,' 0 from taking any of the estate of the deceased. Unfortunately,
most of such legislation was framed with the facts of a particular case in
mind, so that it has not proved flexible enough to cover all situations."For instance, it would be rather difficult for a Pennsylvania court to deny
recovery under the facts of the instant case, because the local statute ' 2
specifies that a murderer may not take, but makes no provision for one
adjudged guilty of manslaughter. The inference would be that one in
that situation would be able to inherit. 3 Thus we have the anomoly that
a killer might have a better chance of recovering in a state whose legislature has tried to remedy this situation than he would in one where there
was no applicable statute at all. The result of following this policy has
been to break down established rules of inheritance in some cases but not
in others, and the inevitable outcome is great confusion in the law. While
the result cannot be too severely criticized on the basis of the policy involved, the methods can. The obvious answer is that the individual states
must take some definite legislative stand, in the form of a comprehensive
statute.' 4 Absent that, the courts should adhere to the provisions of the
descent statutes, and, if the result seems to be too unjust, make use of the
constructive trust where the facts of the particular case warrant it. 15
5. Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927) ; Sherman v. Weber, 113
(I933), 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 183. This view has also been
commented upon by AmEs, loc. cit. supra note 4. This rule, however, is more apt to be
applied in cases involving a will [Riggs v. Palmer, I15 N. Y. 5o6, 22 N. E. 188 (1889)]
although it seems equally well suited to either ATKINSON. Op. cit. supra note 2, at 118.
6. This reasoning was used in the instant case at 931. It has also been invoked in
the statutory enactments dealing with this matter. See Wade, Acquisition of Property
by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution (1936) 49 HAav. L. REv. 715, 724
et seq.
7. The courts thus get around the constitutional prohibition against forfeiture by
saying that nothing is taken away since nothing ever vested in the killer. See Price v.
Hitaffer, i64 Md. 505, 508, z65 AtI. 470, 47I (1933) ; Garwols v. Bankers' Trust Co.,
251 Mich. 420, 428, 232 N. W. 239, 241 (i93o).
8. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
9. A list of these states with a discussion of the provisions is given in Wade,
note 6 supra, at 716-721.
1o. That this stipulation is given great weight was shown in I. re Tarlo's Estate,
315 Pa. 321, 172 Atl. 139 (1934), 83 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 97, where the court held that
the provision did not apply to one who committed suicide after killing the intestates.
ii. Some of the problems involved are discussed in ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note

N. J. Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517

2, at II9.

12. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, §§ 136, 244.
13. Such has been held under a similar statute [CAL. PROD. CODE (Deering, 1933)
§ 258]. In re Estate of Kirby, 62 Cal. 91, 121 Pac. 370 (1912) ; cf. Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 689, i8o Pac. 8II (1919) (under statute providing for conviction of the
killing). The implications of In re Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 Atl. 139 (I934)
would point to the same result in Pennsylvania as was achieved in California.
14. Such a one has been suggested, Wade, note 6 supra, at 753-755.
15. It would seem that the facts of the instant case would not have warranted such
a solution, since there was no evidence of any one else claiming the estate.
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Estoppel-Right of Second Spouse to Attack the Divorce Decree
-The matrimonial domicile was fixed, in a separation action, in New
York. Thereafter, the wife established a bona fide residence in Nevada
and obtained a divorce, service on the husband being by publication only.
Subsequently she remarried and her second husband continued to cohabit
with her after becoming cognizant of the true status of the wife's former
marriage and divorce. In seeking an annulment, he alleges the invalidity
of the Nevada divorce. Held, that although the Nevada decree is not
entitled to full faith and credit since there was no jurisdiction over the
first husband,' the plaintiff is estopped from attacking the relationship
because of the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. Heller v. Heller, 15
N. Y. S. (2d) 469 (S. C. T. T. 1939).
It is true that a marriage contracted during the lifetime of a former
spouse from whom there has been no effectual marital dissolution is void,
and that the second spouse, in theory therefore, would be entitled to a decree of nullity. 2 However, the courts, when faced with an apparently
invalid decree rendered in another jurisdiction,3 have been reluctant to
allow the second spouse to attack that decree where it was felt that it would
result in the perpetration of an outrage on society as well as an injustice
to the defendant. 4 Thus the doctrine of estoppel was invoked, and has
gained much favor in New York. It was early held that the party procuring an invalid divorce was estopped from attacking it. 5 This was
gradually extended to persons who, relying upon an invalid decree, re-7
married,' or persuaded or induced the present spouse to get the decree.
This doctrine, however, did not meet with complete approval in the very
jurisdiction which had first promulgated the rule, and other cases took
the view that the second spouse was not estopped to raise the invalidity of
the divorce as a defense in any action even though he abetted or assisted
in the procurement of the invalid foreign divorce.8 Emphasis in these
cases was placed on the public policy against recognition of such a divorce,' and more particularily, on the fact that the party seeking to assert
I. Domicile has always been considered the jurisdictional requirement for divorce
decrees. A decree of divorce, rendered at the domicile of one of the parties, while the
other is not present nor domiciled there, is not entitled to full faith and credit, unless
the decree was rendered at the matrimonial domicile, Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S.
551 (1913), or the opposing party was personally subject to the jurisdiction of the
court. However, the majority of the states on the principle of comity recognize such

divorces. For an excellent discussion of this jurisdictional problem of domicile and
full faith and credit see GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAws (2d ed. 1938) c. zo; Harper,
The Validity of Void Divorces (930) 79 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 158; Harper, The Myth
of the Void Divorce (1935) 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 335; Leflar, More Faith and
Credit for Divorce Decrees (1939) 4 Mo. L. REV. 268.
2. N. Y. Civ. PR.Ac. ACT (Cahill, 1931) § 1134.
3. Such decree might be void either through fraud, lack of domicile or no personal
service over one of the parties.
4. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1917) (here the
one asserting the invalid divorce was seeking affirmative relief).
5. Curry v. Curry, 79 F. (2d) 172 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1935) ; Matter of Swales, 6o
App. Div. 599, 7o N. Y. Supp. 220 (1goi) ; Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66
N. E. 193 (19o3); Brown v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y. Supp. 877 (1934)
(two justices dissenting on the ground that here the party asserting the invalid decree
was not seeking affirmative relief) ; Matter of Robottom, 248 App. Div. 637, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 397 (1936) ; RESTAT mENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 112.
6. Kelsey v. Kelsey, 204 App. Div. 116, 197 N. Y. Supp. 371 (1922).
7. Van Slyke v. Van Slyke, 186 Mich. 324, 152 N. W. 921 (1915) ; Margulies v.
Margulies, O9 N. J. Eq. 391, 157 Atl. 676 (ig3i); Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App.
Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1917).
8. For a collection of these cases see Note (1939) 122 A. L. R. 1321.
9. O'Dea v. O'Dea, ior N. Y. 23, 4 N. E. IiO (1885) ; Gilson v. Airy, 181 App.
Div. 761, 169 N. Y. Supp. 242 (1918) (in both these cases the second spouse in no
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the invalid divorce did not come into court with a demand for affirmative
relief. 10 That the use of estoppel should depend upon whether or not the
second spouse is seeking affirmative relief seems hard to justify, since the
practical effect of allowing the second spouse to plead the invalid divorce
as a defense is to grant affirmative relief."- The court in the instant case
gave no indication upon what grounds it based its decision, other than
upon the authority of one of the earlier cases.' 2 Whether the court considered as the important factor the fact that plaintiff here was seeking
affirmative relief or whether it was willing to go further and invoke estoppel even in the absence of a demand for affirmative relief is conjectural.
It would seem that legal theory, as well as a sense of social justice, should
do away with this distinction. The unfair conduct of the person attempting to impeach the validity of the divorce should make it inequitable for
him to attack it, whether affirmatively or otherwise. 13 There is no doubt
that estoppel, when combined with the principle of res adjudicata,: 4 lessens,
to a substantial degree, the requirement of domicile as a jurisdictional
basis for divorce. Whether, with the influx of a greater number of these
estoppel cases, the jurisdictional requirement of domicile will be done away
with entirely, is difficult to prophesy, 15 but the instant case may indicate
a trend in that direction.
Gift Tax-Gift by Minor Taxable a Reasonable Time after
Majority within Which Right of Disaffirmance Must Be ExercisedTrust deed naming members of family as beneficiaries was executed by a
minor two days before the effective date of the Gift Tax Act of 1932.1
way participated in the F-i divorce); Risk v. Risk, 169 Misc. 287, 7 N. Y. S. (2d)
418 (1938) (here the second spouse had participated in the F-i divorce).
io. Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N. Y. 463, 173 N. E. 68o (193o); Lefferts v. Lefferts,
263 N. Y. 13, 188 N. E. 279 (1933) ; Matter of Ferry, 155 Misc. i98, 279 N. Y. Supp.
919 (1935) ; Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157, 7 N. E. (2d) 126 (937) ; Schein v.
Schein, 169 Misc. 6o8, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 463 (0938) (in these cases, the defendant in
the action is asserting, as a defense, the invalid divorce obtained by plaintiff). Where
neither party to the original divorce proceedings had resided in F-2, the state of the
presentation, F-2 will not apply the doctrine of estoppel in that situation. Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 8I, 126 N. E. 508 (1920).
ii. Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Divorce by Second Spouses (936)
i5 N. C. L.

REv. 136,

152.

12. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (917).
13. It has been suggested that except where the decree is clearly void as appears
from the record, no attack thereon should be permittd the second spouse. The argument is advanced that just as the law recognizes the doctrine of relativity of estates, so
should it recognize a doctrine of relativity of divorces. Jacobs, supra note ii, at 153,
154.
14. Res adjudicata seems to apply when a person has entered an appearance and
defended a divorce action in a state which lacked jurisdiction. Harper, The Myth of
the Void Divorce, supra note i, at 340.
15. One writer contends that there is actually no requirement of domicile as a
jurisdictional basis for divorce since the principles of res adjudicata and estoppel. combined with the non-likelihood of criminal prosecution, makes it unlikely that the divorce
decree will be successfully attacked. Harper, The Validity of Void Divorces, loc. cit.
supra note i. But see GOODRICH, op. cit. supr-a note i, at 350, n. 46.
i. Revenue Act of 1932, 47 STAT. 245, § 501 (1932), 26 U. S4 C. A. §§ 55o-58o
(934).
The tax imposed under section 5o (a) : "For the calendar year 1932 and each

calendar year thereafter a tax, computed as provided in section 502, shall be imposed
upon the transfer during such calendar year by any individual resident or non-resident,
of property by gift." Hence the only problem was when the transfer was made, and
whether power to disaffirm was such a power "to revest . . . property . . . in
the donor" as had been stated in section 5oi (c) of the 1932 Act before it was crystallized in Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 (933), which repealed section 501 (c) as
being no longer necessary. See also Revenue Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 758 (1934), 26
U. S. C. A. § 580 (i934).
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It contained no express power of revocation, although it did provide for
termination of the trust upon settlor's death prior to reaching majority
(1933), whereupon trustees could distribute the principal. Settlor did not
disaffirm after majority. The Board of Tax Appeals held the transfer
completed when the trust was created, but on appeal it was held, that the
gift took effect upon the expiration of a reasonable time 2 after majority
within which the settlor might have disaffirmed, and hence was taxable

under the Act. Commissioner v. Allen, 404 C. C. H. 194o Fed. Tax Serv.
119133 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).

Recently the courts have been consistent in deciding that a gift is not
complete for tax purposes whenever the donor or settlor retains any power
of revocation.
The holding of the instant case is in accord by analogy,
since the donor here because of her minority 4 maintained some control
over the property after executing the trust deed even though it was not
therein expressed. The oft-stated reason for delaying the tax is that there
is no change of legal rights nor shifting of economic benefits until the gift
is definite and beyond recall,' and it seems that this reason forcibly applies
in the instant case. It is difficult to escape the argument that if the tax
2. The donor reached majority October 9, 1933, and had not disaffirmed by 1939;
the Court said that the New Jersey Statute of Limitations (6 years) was the limit for
disaffirmance. What is a reasonable time within which to disaffirm will depend upon
the circumstances of each particular case. (1935) 22 VA. L. REv. 226.

3. Accord: Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 28o (1933) ; Estate of Sanford v.
Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (I939) ; Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U. S. 54 (1939) ;
Means v. United States, 39 F. (2d) 748 (Ct. Cl. 1930) ; Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F. (2d)
954 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 756 (1937), 5o H.Rv. L. REV. 995.

Cf.

Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929) ; Helvering v. Helmholz, 296
U. S. 93 (1935) (transfer complete although beneficiaries could jointly terminate the
trust) ; White v. Poor, 296 U. S. 98 (1935) (transfer complete although trustees could
jointly terminate the trust, even though settlor was one of the trustees). For a survey
of the present situation under the Gift and Estate Tax Acts, see Hughes, FederalEstate
and Gift Taxes (1938) I6 TAx MAG. 446; Note (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 4oo.
The applicable statute for the instant case was section 5O, (c) of the 1932 Act, see
note i supra. It read: "The tax shall not apply to a transfer of property in trust where
the power to revest in the donor title to such property is vested in the donor, either
alone or in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the
disposition of such property or the income therefrom.

.

.

."

(Italics supplied.)

Where the power was reliquished, other than by death, the gift was complete. The
holding in the instant case would also seem to be in accord with U. S. Treas. Reg. 79,
art. 3, to the effect that: ".

.

. the gift is complete and subject to the tax when the

donor has so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to cause
the beneficial title to be revested in himself." This regulation was criticized in the
Humphreys case at 62 as being in conflict with the statute. But it seems that the instant
case is in accord with both the statute and the regulation.
4. A valid gift inter vivos requires that the donor be competent. Jonte v. English,
171 Okla. 291, 40 P. (2d) 646 (1935). The donor must be of legal age. Mallett v.
Hall, 129 Me. 148, 15o Atl. 531 (930).
If the gift is made by a minor, he may revoke
it when he becomes of age. See THORNTOx, GrS Am ADvANcEMENTS (1893) 89.
5. See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 284 (1933) ; (1938) 86 U. 0F PA. L.
REv. 907. The tax is ". .
aimed at transfers of title that have the quality of a gift,

and a gift is not consummate until put beyond recall." (Cardozo, J., in the Guggenheiin case at 286.)
There has been some confusion as to imposition of the estate tax in the somewhat
analogous situation where the donor retains a possibility of reverter, under section
302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926. Such a possibility defeated imposition of the
estate tax in Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 (1935) ; Becker v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 (1935) ; Helvering v. Duke, 62 F. (2d) 1057
(C. C. A. 3d, 1933), aff'd, 290 U. S. 591 (933).
Contra: Klein v. United States, 283
U. S. 231 (1931). However, the recent decision in Helvering v. Hallock, 8 U. S. L.
WEEK 192 (U. S. 194o), has definitely adopted the position of the Klein case on the
ground that the gift was rendered incomplete until the donor's death and hence fell into
the gross estate for estate tax. This holding, then, would seem to be in the same vein
as the instant case.
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were immediately assessable and the donor later disaffirmed, the tax levied
would bear no fair proportion to the length of time the gift was effective.
And further, since a donee by statute 6 must pay the tax if the donor does
not, if the tax were immediately assessable the donee might have to pay it
and subsequently be relieved of his gift on disaffirmance by the infant donor.
It is true that the power to revoke was not expressed as in previously decided cases; 7 but it seems that the important factor is that the power to
revoke exists, its source being immaterial." Although it may be argued
that such a power was never embraced in the statute,9 the practical result
when the power is extinguished is the same--only then does the "change
of legal rights and . . . shifting of economic benefits" ' 0 come about. It
must be admitted that some property passed when the original transfer
was made,"- but some must also have passed when the power to disaffirm
was terminated. Any estimate of how much at either time would be sheer
guesswork. 1 2 Though there may be a tendency to reduce an infant's dis6. Revenue Act of 1932, 47 STAT. 249 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 559 (934). See
Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 46 (939) ; Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F.
(2d) 954, 955 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 756 (i937). That the decision in the Hesslein case was influenced by the possibility of the donee's statutory liability was mentioned in (1938) 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 907, 9o8. The Government is
fully protected by its lien on the trust res. (1938) 5 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 521, 522.
If the donor had to pay the tax as soon as the transfer was made, then his right of
disaffirmance (in cases where the transfer is made after the Act went into effect) would
seemingly be divested of free exercise. This argument was advonced by Jones, J., in
support of the holding in the instant case. It seems doubtful that the donor would lose
power to disaffirm, although he probably would not be able to reclaim the tax paid.
The Government argued that the infant's power to disaffirm was being subjected to collateral attack by levying the tax. It is true that the acts and contracts of an infant are
valid and binding except only in case the infant himself chooses to exercise his law
given power to avoid them. That is, the right is personal to the infant. Ed Kasch, 25
B. T. A. 284 (1932), aff'd, 63 F. (2d) 466 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; Voorhees v. Wait, I5
N. J. L. 343 (1836) ; DeVito v. City of Mechanicville, 297 N. Y. Supp. 935, 251 App.
Div. 514 (3d Dep't 1937). See also I WILLIsToN, CoNTRAcrs (1936) § 232. This
argument, however, seems untenable, since the court here is merely saying that the
limit for disaffirming has now passed according to the law of New Jersey, and the gift
is now complete.
7. The power reserved over the trust has usually been written in the instrument.
Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 0933). White v. Poor, 296 U. S. 98 (935),
was cited by the Board of Tax Appeals for the proposition that such a power must be
expressed in the instrument to come within the statute. In (936) 20 MINN. L. REv.
444, the position was also taken that the White case stood for such a proposition, but
the Court was therein criticized for so interpreting the statute. However, it seems
that the Court there decided only that a power to revoke, amend or alter was not in the
trust, not that it was absolutely essential to be there in order not to impose the tax.
8. The Court indicates that it is immaterial that the power here is not set out in
the instrument, and that the difference is one of form only and not of substance. The
intent of Congress was that a transfer should not be taxed until all control over the
property is gone. See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 285 (i933).
9. This was the reasoning of the Board of Tax Appeals in the instant case. There
the view was taken that an unqualified gift by an infant was consummate when made,
even if it were a direct gift.
io. See opinion in the instant case. See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 284
(1933), to the effect that Congress, under the Constitution, was at liberty to tax the
transfer as taking effect when the legal rights changed and the economic benefits
shifted. Cf. Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 (1929). See Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 346 (1929). This position has been reiterated in one of the latest Supreme Court decisions, Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner,
3o8 U. S. 39, 43 (i939).
ii. RESTATEmiENT, PROPERTY (936)
§ I53, comment i; (1938) 5 U. CHL L. REv.
521. If the settlor relinquishes all power to revest an interest in himself, but reserves
the right to change the beneficiaries or the amount of their interests, there would seem
to be a transfer of a sufficient interest to justify a gift tax regardless of whether there
might be an estate tax at a future date. (i937) 5o HARv. L. REV. 995.
12. This seems self-evident. See also (1938) 5 U. CH. L. REV. 521, on the effect
of pre-payment or post-payment of the tax when the transfer is incomplete.
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ability for some purposes, 13 to establish a precedent taxing such a transfer
immediately would destroy the protection the law has seen fit to give them.
Some hardship 14 may possibly have been caused in the instant case, but
it seems that the court has achieved a result desirable in the light of decided cases and practical in application.

Judgment-Perjury as a Ground for Vacating a JudgmentPlaintiff, a bondholder of a defunct corporation to which defendant was
indebted, sought to vacate a decree discharging defendant of his indebtedness. The decree was based on a compromise agreement made between
defendant and a receiver of the corporation who was friendly to defendant.
In making the agreement, defendant perjuriously represented his assets as
far less than they actually were. Held, that the decree, having been procured through perjury, must be vacated. Publicker v. Shallcross, io6 F.
(2d) 949 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
It is well settled that a judgment obtained by fraud may be vacated
by a court of equity.' The rule is subject to the proviso, however, that
the fraud must be extrinsic, or collateral to the matter that was the subject of the suit in which the objectionable judgment was rendered.2 The
reason for so restricting the general rule is that if the fraud was intrinsically related to the matter originally litigated, then the victimized party
had ample opportunity to protect himself in the original suit; and having failed so to do, he cannot later avail himself of the fralid as a ground
for vacating the judgment. Beginning with the leading case of United
States v. Throckmorton,4 this reasoning has been broadly extended to judgments rendered on perjured testimony, the weight of authority being that
perjury is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify vacation.5 The reasons
13. Today in general, many acts of infants are voidable which in earlier times were
void, and the protection afforded an infant is not absolute as heretofore. For a good
discussion of this see Note (1935) 2o IowA L. REV. 285. It is also a common practice
to have an infant judicially declared as having legal capacity by a court of equity or to
have the state legislature pass a special act so declaring. See Samuels, Special Legislation Removing Disabilities of Infancy (1939) 15 TENN. L. REvm 655. If this were
done, the gifts would then be binding.
14. Cardozo, J., says in the Guggenheim case at 286: "The construction that is
liberal to one taxpayer may be illiberal to others. One must strike a balance of advantage."
For the proposition that all revocable trusts should be taxed immediately, since one
of the purposes of the Gift Tax was to raise immediate revenue, see (1938) 5 U. CHI.
L. REV. 521.
I. 3 FREEm.N, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 1231; 5 POmERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE (4 th ed. 1919) § 2070. See Marine Insurance Co. v. Hodgson, ii Cranch 332,

336 (U. S. 1813).

2. 3 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note I, § 1233. But "extrinsic" as used in this sense
does not lend itself to exact definition. "Just what fraud 'extrinsic or collateral' is sufficient to warrant a court to act is not very clearly defined under the authorities .
Boring v. Ott, 138 Wis. 26o, 268, 119 N. W. 865, 868 (igo9).

3. Gallagher v. Chilton, 192 S. W. 409 (Mo. 1917).

4. 98 U. S. 61 (1878). The case of Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589 (1891) is
often cited as in conflict with the Throckmorton case, since in the former a judgment
perjuriously obtained was vacated. Note (1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 268. It seems, however, that the cases are clearly distinguishable on their facts, and the status of the federal rule is not so doubtful as has been suggested.
5. Adams v. Martin, 3 Cal. (2d) 246, 44 P. (2d) 572 (i935) ; Crowley v. Behle,
131 S. W. (2d) 383 (Mo. App. 1939); Jacobowitz v. Metsselaar, 268 N. Y. 130, 197
N. E. 169 (1935), reargument denied, 268 N. Y. 630, 198 N. E. 528 (1935), 49 HARv.
L. REv. 327; 3 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note I, § 1241; 5 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note I,
§ 2077; Note (199o) 22 HARv. L. REV. 60o. Contra: Boring v. Ott, 138 Wis. 260, i19
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generally advanced for denying to perjury the vitiating effect of other
frauds are: first, that perjured testimony is one of those tactics which
the unsuccessful litigant must have been prepared to combat,6 and second,
that to recognize perjury as a ground for vacating judgments would lead
to endless litigation.7 Courts refusing to apply the majority rule indicate
as a fallacy in the first argument, that circumstances may arise whereby
the unsuccessful party will be prevented, without fault on his part, from
combating his adversary's perjury. 8 Thus in the instant case the debtor's
perjury was facilitated by the fact that the creditor's receiver was lax
in obtaining the composition agreement. 9 In such a case, where, through
no fault of the creditor, the false testimony of the successful debtor was
not subject to close scrutiny, it seems that the court was quite justified
in vacating the judgment. The second argument, based on the maxim,
interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium,10 is illusory. For example, in Wisconsin, where judgments procured through perjury may be vacated, there
were only four cases attacking .judgments on this ground from 1915 to
1935.1L But even without this gratifying paucity of litigation, the fact of
increased sits is scant reason why a litigant should be permitted to retain
an advantage unscrupulously obtained. The public interest can best be
not by permitting a perjurer to take
served by discouraging perjury, and
2
shelter beneath an aged maxim.1

Process-Validity of Service on Domestic Affiliate to Obtain
Jurisdiction of a Foreign Broadcasting System-Application for a
writ of prohibition to prevent the Superior Court from taking jurisdiction
of the Columbia Broadcasting Company, a foreign corporation, in an action
for defamation in a program furnished by Columbia and broadcast over
station KIRO. Jurisdiction was sought to be obtained over Columbia
by serving the general manager of station KIRO, a domestic corporation
which is independently owned and operated but which is under contract
to furnish its facilities to Columbia during certain hours. Held (one justice dissenting), that service was good, because Columbia was doing business in that state, and station KIRO was its agent.' State ex rel. Columbia Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court for King County et al., 96 P. (2d)
248 (Wash. 1939).
N. W. 865 (igog),. Even where perjury is made a statutory ground of vacation, courts
have refused liberally to give relief against judgments. 3 FREM&AN, op. cit. sUpra note
1, § 1242.

6. See Friese v. Hummel, 26 Ore. 145, 150, 37 Pac. 458, 459 (1894).
7. See Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 134, 25 Pac. 970, 971 (89). In the Throckmorton case the court went so far as to state that increased litigation was a greater evil than
individual instances of unconscionable judgments. United States v. Throckmorton, 98
U. S. 6r, 68 (1878).
8. See Stowell v. Eldred, 26 Wis. 504, 507, 5o8 (187o).
9. Instant case at 951.
io. See United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 65 (1878).
ii. Note (1935) 23 CAL. L. REv. 79.
12. Note (199o) 22 HARV. L. REv. 6oo. But see United States v. Throckmorton,
98 U. S. 61, 68 (1878).
I. 2 WAsH. Rv. STAT. (Remington, 1932) c. 6; § 226, provides that in a suit
against a foreign corporation doing business within the state the summons shall be
served by delivering a copy thereof to any agent, cashier, or secretary of the corporation.
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In a similar case, the New Jersey court recently held service on Columbia to be void, 2 although it reserved decision as to whether Columbia
was doing business in that state.3 Since jurisdiction is not obtained over
a foreign corporation by service on a domestic subsidiary that it owns and
controls, 4 unless the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality of the parent,5
it would seem that service on an independent, part-time lessor of broadcasting facilities should not give the court jurisdiction of the foreign
lessee. The purpose of service is to give the defendant notice of the
suit.6 Although the defendant had notice in the instant case, it might be
doubted that the agent was "of sufficient character . . . to make it reasonably certain that the defendant will be apprised of the service made." 7
Also a foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal
liability, in absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the state 8
and in such a manner as to warrant the inference that it has subjected
itself to the local jurisdiction. 9 There is no clear test to determine if a
foreign corporation is doing business within the state. 10 Each case must
depend on its own individual facts." But it seems that the ultimate determination of jurisdiction should turn on the practical consideration of
the reasonableness of the burden to be placed on the defendant and the
relative inconveniences to each party.12 Radio broadcasting which enables
IIO separate units to transmit the same program throughout the country 23
makes defamation by radio sui generis. 14 A radio system, through its
widespread organization, can reach out into a vast territory and injure
parties in many other states. Perhaps it is not unreasonable, therefore,
to treat it as "doing business" in those states into which its organization
has penetrated and therefore subject to their jurisdictions at least with
respect to causes of action arising out of actual broadcasts.
2. Hoffman v. Carter, 117 N. J. L. 205, 187 Atl. 576 (Sup. Ct. 1936), (937) 21
MINN. L. REv. 594.
3. Hoffman v. Carter, 118 N. J. L. 379, 192 Atl. 825 (937), 26 GEo. L. REV. 158.
4. Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry., 205 U. S. 364 (1907) ; People's

Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79 (I918) ; Cannon Manufacturing
Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1925).
5. Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F. (2d) 623 (N. D. Ohio
1928), (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 8o8, 42 HARV. L. REv. 955; State ex rel. New York
Oil Co. v. Superior Court for Grays Harbor County, 143 Wash. 641, 255 Pac. 103o
(1927).

6. See St. Clair v. Cox, io6 U. S. 350, 356 (1882).
7. Palmer v. Pennsylvania Co., 35 Hun 369, 371 (N. Y. I885). As to who may be
served in an action against a foreign corporation doing business in the state, see Note
(1938) 113 A. L. R. 9.

8. Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518 (1895); Conley v. Mathieson Alkali
Works, I9O U. S. 4o6 (i9o3) ; Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank,
261 U. S. 172 (1923).

q. People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79 (I918) ; Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, Judge, 289 U. S. 85 (933).
io. Farrier, Jurisdictionover Foreign Corporations (933) 17 MINN. L. Ray. 29o;
Note (1935) 19 MINN. L. REv. 557.

ii. See People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 87 (i98);
Roark v. American Distilling Co., 97 F. (2d) 297, 299 (C. C. A. 8th, 2938) ; Brocia v.
Franklin Plan Corp., 235 App. Div. 421, 422, 257 N. Y. Supp. 167, 269 (4th Dep't 1932).
12. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F. (2d) 139, 142 (C. C. A. 2d,
1930).

13. For a description of the operation of chain broadcasting see I SocoLow,

LAw OF RADIO BROADCASTING

THE

(1939) c. XVII.

14. See Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 6I, 65, 74 P. (2d) 2227, 1129 (2938) ; Summit
Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 309 (939), 88 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 122; 2 SocoLow, THE LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING (1939) § 466; Newhouse,
Defanzation by Radio: A New Tort (2938) 17 Oaa. L. REv. 314, 319.

